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Abstract
Background—The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the American 
Association of Poison Control Centers conduct national surveillance on data collected by US 
poison centers to identify incidents of potential public health significance (IPHS). The overarching 
goals of this collaboration are to improve CDC’s national surveillance capacity for public health 
threats, identify early markers of public health incidents and enhance situational awareness. The 
National Poison Data System (NPDS) is used as a surveillance system to automatically identify 
data anomalies.
Purpose—To characterize data anomalies and IPHS captured by national surveillance of poison 
center data over 5 years.
Methods—Data anomalies are identified through three surveillance methodologies: call-volume, 
clinical effect, and case-based. Anomalies are reviewed by a team of epidemiologists and clinical 
toxicologists to determine IPHS using standardized criteria. The authors reviewed IPHS identified 
by these surveillance activities from 2008 through 2012.
Results—Call-volume surveillance identified 384 IPHS; most were related to gas and fume 
exposures (n=229; 59.6%) with the most commonly implicated substance being carbon monoxide 
(CO) (n=92; 22.8%). Clinical-effect surveillance identified 138 IPHS; the majority were related to 
gas and fume exposures (n=58; 42.0%) and gastrointestinal complaints (n=84; 16.2%), and the 
most commonly implicated substance was CO (n=20; 14.4%). Among the 11 case-based 
surveillance definitions, the botulism case definition yielded the highest percentage of identified 
agent-specific illness.
Conclusions—A small proportion of data anomalies were designated as IPHS. Of these, CO 
releases were the most frequently reported IPHS and gastrointestinal syndromes were the most 
commonly reported illness manifestations. poison center data surveillance may be used as an 
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approach to identify exposures, illnesses, and incidents of importance at the national and state 
level.
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Introduction
Since 2002, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has worked with the 
American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC) to identify incidents of potential 
public health significance (IPHS) related to a chemical, radiological, or infectious agent. The 
overarching goals of this collaboration are to (1) improve CDC’s national surveillance 
capacity for public health threats; (2) identify early markers of chemical incidents to ensure 
rapid and effective public health response; and (3) enhance situational awareness and inform 
public health response during a suspected or known public health threat. 1,2 These goals are 
accomplished by conducting surveillance on poison center data.
The United States (U.S.) network of 57 poison centers provides free information and advice 
daily to telephone callers about the potentially hazardous substances and exposures to them. 
They collect demographic, exposure, health, management, and outcome data that are 
uploaded in near real-time into a national database known as the National Poison Data 
System (NPDS). Since 2001, NPDS has collected data on more than 40 million calls. 2–4 
The CDC in collaboration with AAPCC is responsible for all operational-related 
surveillance activities using NPDS, which begin with identifying IPHS. The objective of this 
study is to characterize data anomalies and IPHS captured by national surveillance of poison 
center data from 2008 through 2012.
Methods
The CDC Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and determined that this study does 
not involve identifiable human subjects and further review was not required. IPHS are 
identified by three different automated surveillance methods: call-volume, clinical-effect, 
and case-based. These methods identify data anomalies that represent either individual or 
clusters of exposures and illnesses. Clusters of illnesses are often, but not always, associated 
with a specific event. Call-volume data anomalies are detected when the hourly poison 
center-specific call volume exceeds a historical baseline. The historical baseline is the 
average call volume for that hour during the same 14-day period (7 days preceding the day 
of interest, the day of interest, and 6 days after the day of interest) for the preceding 3 
years. 3 Poison centers use any of the 131 signs, symptoms, and laboratory abnormality 
options available to describe the callers’ clinical presentations, also known as clinical 
effects. Clinical effect data anomalies are identified when the national, cumulative number 
of calls to all poison centers reporting a particular clinical effect exceeds an historical 
baseline. 3 Case-based data anomalies are identified when any call meets specific, user-
defined criteria and is uploaded from a poison center into NPDS. These criteria are 
customizable and can include specific clinical effects, demographic characteristics such as 
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age, certain product exposures, clinical outcomes, and other variables. CDC has 11 active, 
national case-based surveillance definitions considered potentially high-priority exposures 
including arsenic, botulism, ciguatera, cyanide, nerve agents, paralytic shellfish, puffer fish, 
ricin, smallpox, radiation, and acute radiation syndrome. 3
All data anomalies from the above surveillance methods initiate an automated e-mail to 
members of the NPDS surveillance team, made up of CDC epidemiologists and medical 
toxicologists and AAPCC managing directors, who review the data anomaly details within 
24 hours and contact the regional poison center where the data anomaly originated for 
additional information if needed. 1 The team member documents any additional information 
about the incident in a separate, CDC-accessible field within NPDS. The data anomaly is 
then determined to be of public health significance or not based on several criteria which 
have been refined over the years. 1 Basic consensus criteria were established to help team 
members determine potential public health significance, including anomalies associated with 
a reportable exposure, related to an outbreak of illness of unusual severity, associated with 
suspected terrorism, or part of a state of national public health investigation. 1 Examples of 
past IPHS include persons with adverse health effects following exposure to occupational 
and transportation spills, and foodborne outbreaks at restaurants. Lastly, the NPDS 
surveillance team member and/or involved poison center then notifies the appropriate state 
or federal public health organizations if appropriate. Additional information on the process 
of how an incident is determined to be IPHS is available online. 1
In NPDS, potential public health significance determinations were coded in one of four 
ways: “yes,” “no,” “unknown,” or “other.” All IPHS were defined as data anomalies that 
were coded “yes” for potential public health significance. For this study, the analysis was 
restricted to all IPHS “yes” determinations that were captured by national surveillance from 
2008 through 2012 for call-volume, clinical-effect, and case-based anomalies. The authors 
reviewed the NPDS surveillance team member’s original review notes for each IPHS to 
ensure correct characterization.
For call-volume surveillance, the total number of call-volume anomalies and number of 
IPHS were reported. The following general substance type categories were used for IPHS: 
airborne agents (gas, vapor, fumes, and smoke), non-pharmaceutical chemicals, product 
contamination or tampering, food poisoning or water contamination, environmental (e.g., 
red tide, Gulf oil spill), drug or product misuse, and unknown/other. The most frequently 
reported specific agent and the location of each IPHS was identified and grouped by year. 
The location was described as one of the following: occupational (in the workplace), school 
(on school grounds or in the classroom), residential (home setting), public place (e.g., 
restaurant, store), or unknown/other.
For clinical-effect surveillance, the total number of clinical-effect anomalies and number of 
IPHS were reported by year. Incidents were categorized by general, substance-type 
categories, and identified the most frequently reported specific agent by year. Signs and 
symptoms were grouped by the following body systems: gastrointestinal, neurologic, 
cardiovascular, respiratory, dermatologic, ophthalmologic, genitourinary, musculoskeletal, 
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hematologic, metabolic, and general or other. The symptom and laboratory abnormality 
most reported were grouped by year.
Two coauthors evaluated data from all IPHS identified using case-based surveillance during 
the study period. Reviewers analyzed the following case-based surveillance definitions: 
arsenic; nerve agents, organophosphates, carbamates; botulism; puffer fish; paralytic 
shellfish; ciguatera; and cyanide. Definitions identify anomalies either via the exposure to 
the high-priority substance or via specific clinical effects that may suggest exposure to a 
high-priority substance. 3 For example, a reported exposure to arsenic will be identified as a 
data anomaly, and an exposure with clinical effects consistent with arsenic even without 
explicit reported exposure to arsenic will likewise be identified as a data anomaly. 
Reviewers defined suspected true cases as any data anomaly identified using case-based 
surveillance that reported (1) an exposure to the substance of interest and (2) accompanying 
signs and symptoms or laboratory abnormalities, or both, consistent with agent-specific 
illness, as judged by a physician study investigator. Reviewers identified and reported 
suspected cases for each substance by year. Amongst suspected true cases, reviewers 
identified the number of IPHS. Upon reviewing all surveillance methods, coauthors looked 
for duplications in identified incidents for different methodologies in the study period by 
comparing by date, state, and implicated substance. IPHS of different methodologies with 
corroborating incident information were defined as duplications; percentages of duplications 
were calculated amongst the three methodologies.
Results
Call-volume surveillance anomalies
The total number of call-volume data anomalies reported during the study period was 
11,491. A relatively small number of these anomalies was determined to be IPHS (n=384; 
3.3%). Among IPHS, airborne agents (gases, fumes, vapors, and smoke) were the most 
frequently reported substance type, regardless of year. Public place was the most commonly 
reported location (n=99; 24.6%); carbon monoxide (CO) was the most commonly reported 
specific agent when a cause was reported (n= 92, 22.8%). Detailed data regarding these 
IPHS are presented in Table 1.
Clinical effect surveillance anomalies
The total number of data anomalies identified by clinical-effect surveillance was 4,402. 
Among all IPHS, airborne agents (gases, fumes, vapors, and smoke; n=58, 42.0%) were the 
most frequently reported substance type. CO was the most commonly reported specific 
agent when a cause was reported (n=20, 14.4%). The gastrointestinal system (n= 84, 16.2%) 
was the most commonly affected organ system; diarrhea was the most frequently reported 
individual clinical effect (n= 22, 4.3%). Detailed data regarding these IPHS are presented in 
Table 2.
Case-based surveillance anomalies
The total number of data anomalies identified using case-based surveillance was 9,537. The 
total number of data anomalies for each specific surveillance definition was: arsenic 646; 
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carbamates 2,623; botulism 77; puffer fish 136; paralytic shellfish 677; ciguatera 909; and 
cyanide 4,469. Of the 9,537 data anomalies representing possible cases of illnesses to 
specific hazardous agents of interest to CDC, 1 1,388 were determined to be suspected true 
cases of agent-specific illness (14.6%). Botulism (53.2%), puffer fish (39.0%), and ciguatera 
(34.8%) were the surveillance definitions with the highest percentage of suspected cases of 
agent-specific illness. Amongst suspected true cases, botulism (70.7%), followed by 
paralytic shellfish (57.3%), were the surveillance definitions with the highest percentage of 
IPHS. Detailed data regarding these data anomalies are presented in Table 3. Reported 
events for the botulism-associated IPHS (n=29) included ingesting canned food (n=10, 
34.5%) and injecting black-tar heroin (n=5, 17.2%). Amberjack (n=43, 25.3%), barracuda 
(23, 13.5%), and grouper (13, 7.6%) were among the most commonly reported suspected 
sources of reported events for the ciguatera-associated IPHS (n=170).
For the study period, reviewers identified 12% of the IPHS identified using call-volume 
surveillance that was also identified using clinical-effect surveillance. Reviewers identified 
no instances of IPHS identified using case-based surveillance that was also identified using 
call-volume surveillance or clinical-effect surveillance.
Discussion
Airborne exposures to gases, fumes, vapors, and smoke were the most consistently reported 
among all IPHS identified using call-volume and clinical effect-based surveillance. Within 
this category, CO was the most frequently reported substance implicated among IPHS over 
the previous 5 years (excluding the results of case-based surveillance). During 2000–2009, a 
total of 68,316 calls were made to U.S. poison centers about potential contact with CO, the 
majority of which occurred in the home. 5 Annually, approximately 15,000 non-fire–related, 
unintentional, CO-associated emergency department visits occur, with close to 500 
subsequent deaths. 6 Furthermore, CO poisoning in the home is a documented major cause 
of morbidity and mortality, surpassed only by natural disasters such as hurricanes and ice 
storms. 7–9 Thus, many public health campaigns to prevent CO poisoning have targeted 
efforts on promoting installation of home CO alarms and educating the public about the 
dangers of using generators and gas stoves improperly to heat the home. 10 This study 
suggests that most IPHS identified by poison center data involving CO occurred in schools 
or public places rather than residential locations. Potential areas of research to further 
characterize these NPDS-captured public health incidents include correlating reported CO-
related IPHS to the occurrence of both natural disasters and seasonal or regional trends. 
Moreover, these activities can supplement surveillance activities with CO in implementing a 
comprehensive CO poisoning surveillance framework. 11
Gastrointestinal symptoms were among the most common illness manifestations reported for 
IPHS identified by clinical-effect surveillance; the next most frequently reported category 
was neurological symptoms (e.g., confusion, dizziness, headache). These categories are not 
unexpected because adverse health effects caused by gastrointestinal and neurological 
agents, including CO, typically present with nonspecific symptoms such as nausea and 
dizziness, respectively. Of note, CO poisoning is often misdiagnosed as gastroenteritis or 
food poisoning. 12 Furthermore, because exposures and illnesses associated with food 
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poisoning and water contamination were frequently reported, gastrointestinal signs and 
symptoms would be expected. Further research is warranted to determine whether these 
incidents are identified by other state and national surveillance systems.
Call-volume and clinical-effect–based surveillance yielded low proportions of anomalies 
that were elevated to IPHS. These circumstances occur because the anomaly detection 
algorithms were created to maximize sensitivity without overburdening the NPDS 
surveillance team with anomaly analysis of PHS determination. Increasing the sensitivity of 
the system by lowering the threshold for anomaly detection not only results in better 
detection capability for PHS events but also increases the number of false positives of the 
system. Actual sensitivity values cannot be calculated due to the lack of information 
regarding PHS events that are not identified by NPDS.
To ensure efficient use of resources for surveillance activities, we sought to review the 
amount of duplication of IPHS identified by the three different surveillance methodologies. 
A high number of duplications would suggest that the methodologies are not unique and 
significant resources are being utilized to follow-up on the same incident. Reviewers 
identified that 12% of IPHS identified using call-volume surveillance were also identified 
using clinical-effect surveillance and there was no overlap amongst case-based surveillance 
with the other surveillance methodologies. These results imply that, even though both call-
volume and clinical-effect surveillance yielded similar aggregate results in substance type 
and implicated specific agent, these methodologies are inherently unique in their approach in 
identifying data anomalies within this dataset.
Case-based surveillance was able to detect high percentages of suspected true cases for 
botulism and marine toxins. Each state mandates that healthcare providers report certain 
notifiable diseases such as botulism and marine toxin exposure to state and local health 
departments. However, suspected true cases that may not go through healthcare channels, 
such as residential calls to poison centers, may be missed by active reporting of healthcare 
providers. Using these case-based definitions for state and local public health may help close 
the gap between healthcare-reported and self-reported notifiable disease manifestations. 
Further research is warranted to determine the proportion of suspected true cases identified 
by NPDS that are not reported to public health authorities.
The overall proportion of suspected true cases among case-based anomalies was low 
compared to the total number of anomalies, suggesting that modifying current case-based 
definitions likely would improve specificity. The NPDS surveillance team continues to 
refine existing definitions and create new definitions to help meet anticipated public health 
needs. In early 2012, CDC implemented 51 new case-based surveillance categories, 
including the entire Category A and most of the Category B bioterrorism agents.
Upon determination of IPHS, the NPDS surveillance team and the involved poison center 
worked together to make sure that the appropriate state and federal public health 
organizations were aware of the IPHS. This may elicit a state or local public health response 
if officials were not previously aware. The poison centers that take these calls often identify 
these incidents and notify their respective health departments without CDC involvement. 
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However, the authors have found this practice to be somewhat inconsistent across the 
country. This may be due to a variety of factors, including a lack of resources to sustain such 
an activity and an unfamiliarity of what incidents may be of interest to public health. The 
authors hope that this activity continues to build collaboration and familiarity between 
poison centers and public health as well as optimize state health department situational 
awareness. CDC members of the NPDS surveillance team will also notify other federal 
public health organizations if appropriate (i.e., Food and Drug Administration, Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, Environmental Protection Agency). In May 2013, CDC began 
directly notifying state health departments and involved poison centers about IPHS.
Surveillance of poison center data helps identify exposures and illnesses associated with 
large incidents, as well as detect the incidents themselves. This information may be used to 
inform public health response, facilitate public health messaging and education, identify 
exposures and illnesses associated with chemical events, and enhance situational awareness 
during outbreaks. 2 Regional poison centers and state health departments have used poison 
center-based surveillance to detect and identify adverse health effects associated with 
numerous incidents. Incidents which poison center-based surveillance provided benefit 
include the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, the Fukushima radiation incident in 2011, 
and selenium-associated illness linked to an improperly formulated health product in 
2008. 1,13 Additionally, many published studies using poison center data describe features 
and characteristics of calls made to poison centers regarding exposures to a variety of 
substances (e.g., bath salts, 14 spice or synthetic marijuana, 15 CO16). The results presented 
here provide a prospective approach to poison center data analysis that may be of use to 
state and local public health organizations to identify cases of illness related to state-specific 
agents and associated incidents in near real-time. Since NPDS is readily available for poison 
centers and health departments, these surveillance strategies may be a cost-efficient option 
to conduct syndromic surveillance. The surveillance methods presented provide insight to 
the types of incidents and illnesses that can be identified at the state and local level.
There are some limitations to this study. An inherent limitation of NPDS is that the data 
represent exposures but not necessarily confirmed poisonings. However, by reviewing the 
NPDS incident, the team can determine with more certainty whether the reported exposure 
represents an actual poisoning. Changes to the PHS criteria in 2011 may have affected 
interpretation and findings of the captured incidents. The changes altered the overall number 
of captured incidents and the number determined to be of PHS, but these changes may not 
have affected the trend in outcome variables (e.g., gas/vapor/fumes/smoke is still the most 
reported substance type for call-volume anomalies). Another limitation of the PHS process 
is the subjectivity of PHS determination. Because each anomaly is reviewed by a person, it 
is subject to reviewer bias. During the initial stages of surveillance using NPDS, the NPDS 
surveillance team had relative freedom to identify an anomaly as an IPHS. As surveillance 
progressed into 2008 and 2009, the team standardized relative definitions of IPHS and the 
necessary follow-up steps with this determination, which reduced the inconsistency of 
reviewer anomaly analysis.
LAW et al. Page 7














In this study, a small proportion of the total data anomalies were designated as IPHS. Of 
these, CO releases were the most frequently reported IPHS and gastrointestinal syndromes 
were the most commonly reported illness manifestations. Poison center data surveillance 
may be used as an approach to identify exposures, illnesses, and incidents of importance at 
the national and state level. These surveillance strategies can potentially be adapted or 
replicated by state health departments and collaborating poison centers to bolster 
surveillance activities and reduce public health morbidity and mortality.
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